FACTS on Iran’ s Nuclear Issue
1. Neither in IAEA's Statute nor in NPT-Safeguards and even the Additional Protocol, ENRICHMENT and REPROCESSING are prohibited or restricted. Even there in no limit for level by enrichment.
2. Iran signed the Additional Protocol and stated voluntary implementation for 2.5 years since 2003, therefore Iran was not obliged to its provisions prior to 2003.
3. Iran accepted the modified code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement in 2003, therefore had no obligation (informing about nuclear installation) prior to 2003. Therefore, Iran was only obliged according to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153) to inform the IAEA 180 days prior to feeding nuclear material into facility.
4. Iran informed the IAEA about Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) by inviting the DG in 2000 which was 4 years prior its operation in 2004, that is to say 4 years before being obliged to do so.
5. Based on paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above, Iran had not any “Non-compliance” with its NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, not informing about Natanz Enrichment Plant, prior to the time which the DG of IAEA was informed of and invited to visit in 2002 and 2003.
6. There is no single document as "Legally Binding International Instrument for Assurance of Nuclear Supply" to guarantee the fuel for nuclear power plants. It is recalled that the IAEA Committee of Assurances of Supply (CAS), after 7 years of negotiations, failed in 1987.
7. Iran has not received legally binding assurance for the fuel for Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant for its life time, even not for a decade.
8. Following the swipe sampling where some contamination of uranium particles with low and high particles were found, Iran agreed to voluntarily suspend for a short time aimed at facilitating the technical work of the Agency to verify the assertion of Iran that the source of uranium contamination is from outside of Iran and not as the result of enrichment in Natanz. The DG confirmed the assertion of Iran in June 2004. Therefore Iran had to stop the voluntary suspension.
9. According to the Work Plan, understanding between Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA in August 2007 (INFCIRC/711), Iran accepted to resolve the outstanding issue. Since September 2007 to January 2008 a course of intensive discussions was hold to resolve the 6 outstanding issues contained in the work plan; Plutonium, P1 and P2 centrifuge, U-metal, Po-210, Source of contamination, and the Gachin mine. Finally according to the reports of the Director General (GOV/2007/58, 15 November 2007 and GOV/2008/4, 22 February 2008) , all 6 outstanding issues have been resolved.
10. In all the Resolutions of the Board of Governors of the IAEA, the “Suspension” was considered as “Non-legally binding, voluntary, and confidence building measure”.
11. Director General of the IAEA has stated in his reports to the Board of Governors, copies to the United Nations Security Council, that there is no evidence of “Reprocessing activities”. Therefore, there is no technical and legal justification for requesting Iran to suspend an activity which does not exist.
12. Even if Iran considers the Resolutions of the Agency’s Board of Governors as well as those of the United Nation Security Council legally unjustified with political motivation, but as the result of extensive proactive cooperation of Iran with the Agency, fully implementing the Work Plan, resolving all outstanding issues, the demand for suspension of enrichment has lost it technical, legal grounds too.
13. In accordance to the Work Plan, after the resolution of the outstanding issue, the safeguards implantation in Iran will be in routine manner.
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