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Statement by H.E. Ambassador Soltanieh Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran Before the IAEA Board of Governors Agenda Item 7(c), Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Vienna,5 June 2008 |
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In the name of God Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates, At the outset, on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran I would like to express deepest sorrow and condolences to the great nations of China and Myanmar and their Governments for the sad natural disaster which resulted the lost of thousands of lives. Mr. Chairman, Expressing the sincere appreciation of my Government for the continuous valuable support of the Member States of the Non-Aligned Movement, I associate myself to the positions declared by the distinguished Ambassador of Cuba in her capacity as the Chairperson of the NAM. Mr. Chairman, It is a matter of serious concern that the Agency's cooperative environment is continuously poisoned by politically motivated statements of a few countries aiming at deviating Agency from its statutory promotional mandate namely facilitating and accelerating cooperation among Member States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is regretful that after 5 years of continuous proactive cooperation by the Islamic Republic of Iran, this issue is still on the Agendas item of Board of Governors. I recall that at the eve of each meeting of the BG, the United States have brought new allegations supported by couples of its allies in order to undermine and overshadow the progress made during the intercessional periods and keep the file open. In this context, on behalf of my Government I express deep disappointment of the status quo which is as the result of creating impediments on the Agency's verification process, as rightly reported by the Director General to this session. However, the crux of the matter and the most important message to the international community which has continuously been reported by the Director General (GOV/2008/15) is that after the most robust inspections in the history of the IAEA, once again the Director General reconfirmed that “the Agency was able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran” and all nuclear material are accounted for and remain peaceful. Furthermore, the latest report of the Director General contains other facts regarding Iran's nuclear program which proves it as a transparent and peaceful program. The following are some examples to be put on the record and to let the world know the ill intention of few countries that have not addressed in their statements: - Para 2: All nuclear material at FEP, as well as all installed cascades, remains under Agency containment and surveillance. - Para 4: All nuclear material at PFEP, as well as the cascade area, remains under Agency containment and surveillance. - Para 5: Since March 2007, fourteen unannounced inspections have been conducted. - Para 6: The Agency has continued monitoring the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (the MIX Facility) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) through inspections and design information verification (DIV). There have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities. - Para 7: On 13 May 2008, the Agency carried out design information verification at the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40). The Agency has continued to monitor the status of the Heavy Water Production Plant using satellite imagery. - Para 8: On 10 May 2008, the Agency conducted a DIV at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP). - Para 9: All of produced UF6 remains under Agency containment and surveillance. - Para 11: In March and April 2008, Iran provided revised design information for FEP and PFEP. - Para 11: The Agency was able to ensure that all necessary safeguards measures, including containment and surveillance, were in place before UF6 was fed into the newly installed centrifuges. - Para 12: Since February 2008, all fuel assemblies imported from the Russian Federation for use in the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant have remained under Agency seal. - Para 15: During a meeting in Tehran on 21–22 April 2008, Iran agreed to address the alleged studies, the procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and companies, and questions which had been raised in the Agency’s letters of 8 February and 12 February 2008. - Para 15: On 9 May 2008, the Agency submitted a request for additional clarifications relevant to the nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Iran provided its response to these questions on 23 May 2008, which is being assessed by the Agency. - Para 18: On 14 May 2008, Iran provided in writing its overall assessment of the documents presented to it by the Agency. - Para 24: It should be noted that the Agency currently has no information – apart from the uranium metal document – on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies. - Para 26: The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. - Para 26: Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. - Para 28: It should be emphasized that the Agency has not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies. Furthermore, in the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) every year Iran has been among those Member States that “the Secretariat was able to conclude that declared nuclear materials remained in peaceful activities.” Considering the above mentioned factual reports therefore the Agency has fulfilled its statuary mandate in assuring the non-diversion of peaceful activities of Iran and since all nuclear activities of Iran are for peaceful purposes and all 6 remaining outstanding issues have been resolved according to the agreed Work Plan, there is no justification that the Iran nuclear issue be remained in the agenda of the Board of Governors, and thus Safeguards has to be implemented in a routine manner. Mr. Chairman, As the consequence of irresponsible attitude and conduct of few western countries particularly the United States vis-à-vis Israeli clandestine nuclear activities and aggressive military attacks against nuclear facilities of Member States during past decades, Prime Minister of Israeli regime dared to publicly acknowledge the possession of nuclear weapon. The said western countries have not expressed concern and prevented the issue which is the serious international security concern be dealt with in the IAEA or the NPT. This is in defiance the demands of the overwhelming majority of the Agency’s Member States and disregard the international community at large. In this context I would like to recall the legitimate expectation of majority of Member States, which I reflected in the General Conference in 2007 as well the last Board of Governors, that the Agency makes investigation on the validity of two contradictory statements by prime minister and the representative of Israeli regime regarding the possession of nuclear weapons which is serious threat to the regional and international security. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out the following major concerns:. 1. According to the Article IV of the Treaty on Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. It also stipulates all the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To this end, the nuclear and industrial states committing numerous breaches of their obligations which can in turn result in infliction of damages on a State Party. Some of the breaches and consequential damages are as follows: imposing Unnecessary Costs on the Agency, violation of Article IV of the NPT by hampering peaceful nuclear activities of a State Party, imposing measures beyond the existing legal commitments of a State Party including suspension of peaceful nuclear activities which can cause lots of human, financial and political damages, breach of Article XI of the IAEA Statute on facilitating the technical cooperation projects, involving the Security Council unlawfully, interruption of technical cooperation of the Agency with a State Party while the raison d’etre of the Agency is to help the Member States in this field, damage to the authority and credibility of the Agency, intellectual damages, particularly damage to reputation of a State Party. Given to the above-mentioned points, this question arises that “who should compensate theses damages and how the compensation should be made?” In the case of Iran, the damager countries should, as a minimum step, admit their mistakes, apologize to the great nation of Iran, correct their behavior, and above all, compensate all the damages they have inflicted on the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Islamic republic of Iran and its citizens have the right to resort to legal actions to seek redress against the sponsors of these unlawful actions. These countries should accept the responsibility for their actions and must be held accountable. 2. There is a great concern that by entering the Agency in issues beyond its Statute, namely non-nuclear issues such as high explosives and missile, deviate it from its statutory mandate and creates additional constraints for the Secretariat, and a new destructive precedence to the credibility of the Agency. 3. This is very disappointing to notice discriminative approach regarding the process of reporting verification activities to the BoG. While the issue of Iran has been continuously discussed since 5 years ago, we are witnessing that regarding other Member States which have had non-compliance with their safeguards obligations and had clandestine activities on enrichment and reprocessing without any notification to the Agency, has never been discussed in the BoG since 2004, where during the discussion on SIR of 2007 the Member States were just informed that the issues are concluded and closed. 4. Unfortunately, the Agency has been mainly focusing on one pillar of the IAEA Statute namely Safeguards. This has resulted in the Agency being known as a "nuclear watchdog" and has overshadowed the main activities of the Agency in promoting peaceful applications, of which there is growing interest among Member States. It must be mentioned that due to the political action by the Board of Governors and the intervention of the United Nations Security Council, the main part of responsibilities and duties of the Agency which is promotion and facilitation of nuclear peaceful activities, has been exposed to serious threat and authority of the Agency have remarkably jeopardized. In this regard, I would like once again to reiterate our position: Article III of the IAEA Statute which states “In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall not make assistance to members subject to any political, economic, military, or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of this Statute”. The Agency’s guideline INFCIRC/267 which was approved by the Board of Governors also emphasizes that the provision of technical assistance constitutes a major, high-priority function of the Agency, and responsibility for its success devolves on all Departments of the Secretariat. It is further emphasized that the Agency shall not make technical assistance subject to any political condition. Mr. Chairman, Alleged Studies In order to facilitate the fair judgment of distinguished delegations and Member States at large, my Government decided to provide copies of the confidential information on alleged studies and comprehensive explanation proving that the documents are forged and fabricate. A member of each delegation could receive the package, at the 7th floor of the VIC (room C07 39) after my statement and conclusion of this item. However I have to put on record the following points: - Primarily the main goal of the Work Plan was that the remaining issues had been addressed for once and not turned to an endless process. - Item III of the agreed work plan reads as: “… the Agency will however provide Iran with access to the documentation it has in its possession regarding: the green salt project, the high explosive testing and the missile re-entry vehicle. … Upon receiving all related documents, Iran will review and inform the Agency of its assessment.” - Due to the pressures imposed by US who was not satisfied with the work plan and its progress, the Agency was not allowed to deliver alleged documents to Iran but only showed to Iran just 86 pages and then requested Iran to explain them. - While according to the work plan, discussion meetings or interview with individuals were not foreseen, but Iran in good will and cooperation with the Agency agreed to have discussion and also provided the Agency with the supporting documents. As DDG-SG stated during the meetings, the Agency showed all alleged studies related documents to Iran. Then Iran provided the Agency with its assessment both in oral and in written. - Just in the time that the Agency was preparing its March 2008 report to the BoG, US presented to the Agency some new alleged documents to open an endless process on this matter. - The Agency was expected that according to the agreed work plan to close this matter. Even if some new information came to the Agency’s knowledge, it would be discussed under relevant safeguards procedure. But, unfortunately unlike the very constructive cooperation between Iran and the Agency in implementing the work plan and dealing with the alleged studies, and also in contrary to the tremendous progress achieved in this regards, because of the pressures imposed by the US, some fabricated and forgery slides have been shown in the technical briefing for the Agency’s members. This has happened while the Agency has had not finished its assessment on the statements made by Iran. - I recall the fact that the Agency was not able to fulfill its obligation in delivering the materials on alleged studies due to unjustified political pressure on and interference by United States in the Secretariat functions, preventing the documents be delivered in accordance with Paragraph III of the Work Plan. - There is a simple question: if a Member State gives materials or alleged documents claiming diversion of nuclear materials and activities to military purposes, has it right to dictate and give instruction to the Secretariat how and when to use it? Are not these violations of the Statute? - Despite the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran has provided its final assessment on the alleged studies to the Agency, Iran on the base of good will and constructive cooperation agreed with the agency's request to visit Iran, in order to deal with this subject, till the Agency will be able to address the ambiguities raised by one state, in spite of the fact that the Work Plan has been accomplished. - In this regard Iran discussed the alleged studies in several meetings with the Agency's delegation. More than 200 written pages response have been provided, despite the fact that it wasn’t stipulated in the Work Plan. - Iran requested to receive at least the list of Alleged Studies being provided to it for the sake of clarity on the scope of the subject and avoiding the endless process. In this regard the DDG –SG provided to Iran a list of all alleged studies documents. Iran requested that for the new round of discussion at least a copy of this documents will be provided to Iran to in order to enable go thorough the documents and provide the required responses. Unfortunately it has been we have been told that the Agency is not authorized to do so because the US gave no permission to deliver the written documents on alleged studies during the discussions to Iran. Therefore, Iran was only able to see the electronic version through the power point presentation. This situation caused serious obstacles for Iran and in the process of Agency's professional and impartial task. Despite of these impediments, Iranian experts took note and reviewed the electronic versions in three days and the result of deliberations contained by the written report with oral explanations have been provided in writing to the Agency, this matter has been reflected in the of DG's recent report, paragraph 18. - All demonstrated pages on the alleged studies are 86 pages that entirely are baseless, forgery and fabricated. - The only item which have been used to attribute to the alleged documents to Iran were the Persian words in some of them and nothing else. - Iran stated that has not been involved in such activities. - According to the Work Plan we have accomplished our undertaking in providing the assessments. ( according to the DG report in Para 18) - According to the work plan, Iran provided the Agency with a copy of 15 pages U-metal document, so this issue has been closed. - Except one document, all documents on alleged studies have been provided to the Agency by the US. - None of the information in the alleged studies is substantive. - None of the shown documents are authenticated. The original documents were not provided to Iran, since in that case their fabrication would be proved simply. - Only a few of the shown pages have been made-up in the form of a letter which none of them were in conformity with the official letter format of the MOD. And the rest are only some pages that there are some typed sentences on them. None of the documents and materials presented by the Agency, had classification sign. - According to DG's recent report: Para 24: It should be noted that the Agency currently has no information on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies. Para 28: It should be emphasized that the Agency has not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies.
Mr. Chairman, While reiterating the policy of continuing cooperation with the Agency in accordance with Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement ( INFCIRC/214), I would like to put on record the following information on recent development: The Islamic Republic of Iran still maintains that the constructive interaction, logical negotiations based on justice and without preconditions as well as mutual respects is the basic solution for the promotion and improvement of International situations and circumstances. The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the view that resorting to the two track approach based on intimidation and negotiation not only would not help resolving issues, but also will further complicate the situation. Iranian Great Nation with thousand years of civilization shall not tolerate uncivilized language of threat, intimidation, and humiliation. In this context, while the Islamic Republic of Iran continues its full cooperation with the IAEA, it also follows the track of negotiations in various global areas including application of nuclear energy for peace and prosperity in the world. In the same token, I would like to reiterate that the Islamic Republic of Iran spars no effort towards achieving the world’s stability and peace. The power and the capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran can contribute to the regional and international peace and stability. The Islamic Republic of Iran on its part, following a depth and proficient studies and considerations, prepared carefully a package of important initiatives and proposals in different political, security, economic and nuclear fields that have been submitted to countries of the Group of 5+1. This package was prepared in view of justice, sovereignty and mutual respects and as a basis for comprehensive and vast negotiations with countries concerned, based on collective commitments. I would like to elaborate some elements of the nuclear part of the package which is in the context of the IAEA: "With regards to the nuclear issue, Iran is ready - in a comprehensive manner - and as an active and influential member of the NPT and the IAEA, to consider the following issues: - Obtaining a further assurance about the non-diversion of the nuclear activities of different countries. - Establishing enrichment and nuclear fuel production consortiums in different parts of the world – including in Iran. - Cooperation to access and utilize peaceful nuclear technology and facilitating its usage by all states. - Nuclear disarmament and establishment of a follow up committee. - Improved supervision by the IAEA over the nuclear activity of different states. - Joint collaboration over nuclear safety and physical protection. - An effort to encourage other states to control the export of nuclear material and equipment.
We are of the firm belief that the present package will provide an exceptional opportunity for a real, serious and tangible cooperation among the concerned parties. I would like to emphasize that the principled approach of the Islamic Republic of Iran to this package is a strategic one. On this basis the concerned parties, are expected to acknowledge the importance of the issue and substance of the proposed package as a comprehensive solution to the regional and global problems and challenges as well as a basis for long-term cooperation and to deal with it in a constructive manner. This is a historical test of political wills and determinations for peaceful resolution of global challenges. Mr. Chairman, In conclusion I reiterate that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a responsible State and full transparent in its nuclear activities, within the framework of its legal obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards, while it shall never compromise on its inalienable rights. Thank You ****** |