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By
H.E. Dr.Soltanieh
Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations and other International Organizations in Vienna
Addressed to
Austrian Institute for International Affaires (OIIP)
Vienna
15th December 2006
Facts and Figures about Peaceful Nuclear Policy and Activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Short Glance at the History:
The first step in Iran's history of nuclear science and technology started in 1956 by signing an agreement between Iran and the United States of America. This agreement was ratified two years later in the then National consultative Assembly. Further to this agreement, Tehran University established a centre called "Tehran University Atomic Centre" for training and research purposes. Later in 1959, construction of one reactor was approved. Its construction started in 1961 and in 1967 reached a critical point and was commissioned. The fuel for this 5-MW reactor was 93% enriched uranium supplied by the USA. The United States of America also provided Iran with Hot cell equipment for separation of plutonium.
Throughout 70s Iran was extremely advancing in the field of nuclear science and technology. These years witnessed a great deal of agreements and contracts with different countries. A summary of those developments is as follows:
1972, 7th January, Iran and Canada signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology.
1974 - The establishment of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) .The Atomic Centre of Tehran University, including its 5 MW Research Reactor was placed under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Agreements were made with potential foreign suppliers for construction of nuclear plants for generation of 23000 MW electricity was approved and the AEOI was mandated to implement.
1974 - Iran and France signed a 15 -year letter of agreement in scientific, technical and industrial cooperation for peaceful nuclear applications. All other contracts between Iran and French companies were signed with reference to this agreement.
1975 - The letter of agreement of mutual cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear power between Iran and West Germany was signed.
1975 - The contract of purchasing large amount of natural uranium between Iran and English companies was signed.
1976 - The agreement between Iran and KWU for the construction of two 1300 MW units and supply of its initial fuel and its 30-year supply was made.
1976 - Five letters of agreement between AEOI and General Atomic Company of USA were signed.
1977-Agreement between AEOI and four French companies for construction of two power plants in Darkhovin was made.
1977 - The letter of agreement between AEOI and English companies on conversion of natural uranium to UF6 was signed.
1977 - An agreement on training between AEOI and Atomic Research Centre of Karlsruhe of Germany was signed.
The main purpose of the above mentioned agreements and contracts was construction of nuclear power plants in a period of 15-year. From 1974 to 1978 the contract of constructing 8 plants were signed between AEOI and foreign contractors. They were as follows:
1. Bushehr Nuclear Power Plants (1& 2)
The contract of two 1300 MW units was signed with the German Company of KWU. As the suspension of the project by Germany in 1979, its first unit was almost 90 percent complete. The Unit is not yet, after 3 decades ready for operation. Russia is entrusted to make it ready by 2007.
2. Karun Nuclear Power Plants (3&4)
The contract of two 950 MW units at the site of Darkhovin was signed in 1974 with the French company Framatome.
3. Isfahan Nuclear Power Plants (5&6)
The contract of two 1290 MW units was signed with Germany's KWU.
4. Saveh Nuclear Power Plants (7&8)
The contract of two 1290 MW units was signed with Germany's KWU.
One could easily conclude that the claim of lack of justification for Iran to have nuclear energy, having oil and gas resources where such claim is not made for other countries in particular US with vast fossil resources and huge nuclear power production, is a double standard. It has to be reminded that 30 years ago Iran's natural resources were much more than now and the population was half, and Iran was not yet able to convert the oil to various petrochemical by-products, where now it has huge petrochemical industry, that is the added value of oil is much more than 30 years ago where US and European persuaded Iran to choose nuclear option.
Iran’s Nuclear Policy: Non-proliferation and Disarmament
A short glance at the Iranian status with regard to international instruments dealing with weapons of mass destruction would better help us to analyze the Iran’s peaceful nuclear program. Iran’s longstanding support for strengthening disarmament treaties could be summarized as the following:
· Iran is a member to the NPT since 1974 and has a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and was the only Member State voluntarily implementing the Additional Protocol until the nuclear dossier was conveyed to the United Nations Security Council.
· In addition to the above commitments to international instruments, Iran is almost a member to all WMD instruments. Iran is a full member to the BWC, CWC and actively participates in all relevant meetings, such as 7-year intensive negotiation on BWC Protocol, with the view to promote the objectives of these instruments.
· Iran’s has always supported the idea of the establishment of NWFZ in all regions in particular in the Middle East. In fact, Iran itself took the initiative in 1974 to propose the establishment of the NWFZ in the Middle East. Regretfully Israel has put this essential peaceful initiative, unanimously supported by all other members of the UN and the IAEA, in a vicious cycle. There is no prospect for the realization of this noble Idea.
· Most recent declaration by the prime minister of Israel, of the possession of nuclear weapons proves the assertion of international community of the clandestine activities on nuclear weapons by Israeli regime and the reason for continuous defiant and rejection of the international calls to adhere the NPT and putting the nuclear installation under the IAEA ' surveillances.
· Above all those undertakings, I should also add that our firm commitment to the elimination of all categories of WMD is rooted in our religious thinking to remove threats to humanity. This view has in a number of occasions, reiterated by our religious leaders, in particular the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as religiously forbidden.
· It has to be recalled that Iran has always played as a responsible member of the international community. As an evidence to our responsibility, Iran as the last victim of WMD in the 20th century has suffered a lot by the extensive use of chemical weapons by Sadam Regime, fully supported by the United States and some European countries. Many chemical victims were treated and cured in Austrian hospital, thanks to eminent Austrian physicians. However, Iran never retaliated with WMD. Iran was the most active participant in the course of negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and was among the first group of countries which ratified and let the convention to enter into force.
A short glance to Iran’s peaceful nuclear program
Prospects and developments
I don’t intend to review the whole developments with regard to Iran & IAEA cooperation. I limit myself to some of the important developments, which paved the ground for removing Iranian nuclear issue from the BOG’s Agenda in November 2004. I would like to elaborate a little bit on this issue and touch on the different dimensions of the issue at hand namely technical, legal and political.
Technical and legal Dimension
· During the course of the last four years Iran has been increasingly intensified its cooperation with the Agency and opened its doors to one of the most expansive and intrusive IAEA inspections. As a result of full and proactive cooperation of Iran, a robust verification is now in place in Iran and that the Agency’s inspection activities are unhindered and working smoothly as a routine Safeguards matter.
· All significant issues, particularly those related to the sources of HEU, have now been resolved. Indeed, except for few questions, mostly speculative, nothing more remains to close this chapter.
· After one more year and over 2000 person-days of the most rigorous inspections, unprecedented in the history of the IAEA, the Director-General again confirmed in his November 2006 report that:. all declared nuclear materials in Iran have been accounted for, and therefore, such materials have not been diverted to prohibited activities. He also added that the Agency is able to verify that the material and activities are not diverted to prohibited purposes.
· In fact the positive trend in resolving issues related to implementation of Safeguards in Iran clearly shows the competent of the IAEA to deal with the issue. Therefore we strongly believe that this issue should be resolved in the framework of the IAEA, on a technical basis and as soon as possible. Iran did declared, on 27 April 2006 that the few remaining outstanding issue which are beyond its legal obligations, as Director General has confirmed, could be dealt with if the nuclear dossier is returned back in full, from the United Nations Security Council, to the IAEA Framework where it belongs to.
· It is without saying that almost in all occasions, the majority of Member States, which is countries of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), while welcoming Iran’s proactive cooperation with the Agency, has emphasized among the other important issues, on the inalienable rights to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and on the competence of the Agency to deal with the issue.
· The Agency in doing its functions has never been hindered by Iran. Iran would continue its cooperation with the Agency based on its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/214).
Political Dimension
In addition to the extensive cooperation of Iran with the Agency and implementing relevant safeguard obligations, the I.R. of Iran has taken extra miles to promote confidence with regard to peaceful nature of its nuclear program. In the same spirit Iran decided to implement further confidence-building measures:
· Iran in the last four years voluntarily suspended its enrichment activities. We adhered to this commitment to give more chance to the positive atmosphere already created by Iran’s full and proactive cooperation with the Agency.
· By granting access to military sites to the Agency, Iran did also take additional measures beyond its safeguards obligations, proving its political will for maximum transparency. All the allegations by the United States were proved to be, through the Agency’s investigation, on site inspections, and sampling, baseless.
· Regarding the EU3-Iran negotiation it has to be declared that: EU agreed in written “Temporary Suspension” but they in fact intended and attempted for “Total cessation” of not only enrichment activities but all nuclear activities in Iran. EU3 did not take any independent initiative to recognize the right of Iran to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under relevant international instruments. The EU3 interlocutors were completely bound to the conditions put by a third party, United States. This attitude derailed the whole process.
The EU3 misunderstanding that by granting some non-nuclear incentives, Iran will give up its inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes including fuel production.
· Iran in exercising its right under NPT decided in August to start its UCF activities in Esfahan, which is completely under the IAEA Agency surveillance. This measure was in place as confidence building measure, therefore it couldn’t be transformed to any kind of legally binding commitments, as confirmed even in the resolutions of the Board of Governors.
· In accordance with the law passed by parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Government had to stop voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, after the technical nuclear dossier was referred to the United Nations Security Council, the political and security oriented body.
· In spite of the unjustified resolution 1696 adopted by the UN Security Council, Iran has decided to continue its proactive cooperation with the Agency.
· It has declared its readiness to remove ambiguities, if any, about its nuclear activities.
· It is obvious that negotiation shall take into account proposals, which could have more chance to reach consensus between both parties. In this regard, the President of the I.R of Iran at the 60th General Assembly indicated that "Iran is prepared as a confidence building measure to engage with in serious partnership with private and public sectors of other countries in the implementation of the Fuel cycle. This process provides utmost transparency and gives a solid basis for the best solution to this unwanted impasse".
In Conclusion:
· If US and EU3 pursue the adoption of a resolution, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, imposing sanctions that is penalizing Iran for being party to the NPT, then the international community shall become fully convinced that the said countries are determined to follow the confrontation route, which is lose- lose game jeopardizing international security.
· Our straight forward, positive and constructive proposal is as follows:
Total disengagement of the United Nations Security Council and return the nuclear dossier in full, to the IAEA’s framework, where it belongs. As announced in number of occasions, the Islamic Republic of Iran is full prepared to enter into negotiation with a view to avoid confrontation without any precondition. This negotiation shall be pursued in good faith with the aim to provide further assurances of Iran’s nuclear program to remain exclusively peaceful.
I highly expect distinguished audience, being the academia and elites, to promptly reflect the above facts and figures, as well as the clear message to the public and the decision makers at the crucial juncture.
Thanks for your kind attention