23 November 2007
Response of the Islamic Republic of Iran
To the comments made during
The Board of Governors’ Meeting,
November 2007
Mr. Chairman,
Since in our culture we do not leave any question unanswered, as we have done so with the Agency's Secretariat, I seek your indulgence to bear with me to give brief comments on some of the statements made yesterday. I have to remind some of the events during deliberations of Iran's nuclear issue at the Board of Governors since 2003:
At the eve of each Board of Governors and at the time of a great break-through as a result of conclusion of an issue as the result of intensive joint work by Iran and IAEA, US raised an allegation against Iran, such as existence of nuclear weapons in sites specially military sites such as Parchine. During the meeting a handful members particularly France, UK and Australia, did put fuel to the increase the flame. A clear example is an extraordinary concession by Iran during the negotiation with EU3 in Paris which led to Paris agreement where Iran agreed to expand the suspension of enrichment even to uranium conversion activities at UCF in Esfahan, though it has nothing to do with enrichment process. Surprisingly most probably due to pressure by US, the counterpart of Iran in Paris that is EU3 proposed tougher resolution against Iran. The world expected that if US is proposing tougher measure our interlucator EU3, defends Iran and prevent escalation and confrontation.
Therefore, my Government came to conclusion that no matter how much it make concession they are intending to keep Iran's issue in the Agenda since there was a hidden agenda, to pave the way to refer to United Nations Security Council in order to impose sanction and further punitive measures.
The international community be aware of the bitter fact that in 2003 Iran was first requested by EU3 to only suspension feeding UF6 to centrifuge machines until the Agency clarifies the source of uranium particles contamination in Natanz. Even if in 2004 Agency confirmed the assertion of Iran that the source of contaminated particle is outside of Iran and not as the result of any enrichment activities in Iran, US continued to create tension so that ultimately in 2006 expanded to even R&D. This means to deprive Iranian great nation with thousand years of civilization, from even research and thinking which is the fundamental human right. You are all aware of the basic scientific criteria that if one continuously increase pressure of a container it will explode. There is a limit to compromise and self restraint vis-a-vis political pressure. Iran could not let the unjust attitude and conduct continue therefore it had to stop, after 2.5 years, voluntary and non-legally binding suspension of enrichment as well as voluntary implementation of Additional Protocol, which is not a legally binding instrument anyway.
The same scenario is repeated yesterday. Almost all Member States are warmly welcoming the significant progress, as Director General reported, in implementing of the Work Plan leading to conclusion and closure of P1/P2 issue as well as Uranium metal in addition of Plutonium, but US and few members isolate themselves by totally ignoring the latest factual developments and by re-reading the obsolete text of their statement of 2003!
I sincerely advise them to learn lesson from the past and not to repeat the past mistakes which might push us all to confrontation.
Permit me also to touch upon couple of other remarks made in this meeting:
Regarding the notion of reactive used in the DG written report which has caused misunderstanding, I have to first recall the oral report of DG requesting Iran for “more proactive cooperation” that means that Iran has already had “proactive cooperation”.
Second, obviously the nature of work plan is such a way that we have to receive questions first then to respond; this is not a negative attitude but practical.
Mr. Chairman
The unfounded, hypostatical statement read out by France that Iran will make one nuclear weapon after one year using 3000 centrifuge machine, reminded me that in this Board of Governors, over 2 years ago, US delegate warned the Board of Governors and the world at large, that soon an Iranian engineer who has ordered 4000 magnets for P2 centrifuge, costing about couple dollars each, though he has not yet received, will be able to make 2 nuclear weapons. More regretful is Mr. Goldshmit the former DDG for Safeguards, chairing the technical briefing for member states confirmed the 2 nuclear explosive! I have to inform that over 90 items, one of which is magnet, are needed to make a centrifuge machine! Even an undergraduate student can understand that one can not make nuclear weapon with magnet which could be used for radio speaker! These kind of no-technical discussion shall have serious consequence for technical credibility of the IAEA.
The last but not the least is the positive deployment of entre into force of the Facility Attachment of Natanz Enrichment Facility, based on which well organized and most effective Safeguards surveillance is applied since 30 September 2007, as Director General stated in his oral Report "We also have in place a safeguards approach for the Natanz facility that enables us to credibly verify all enrichment activities there". There fore there is no technical and legal excuse or concern for exclusively peaceful nature of enrichment activities both in present and in future.
I remind that the Prime Minister of the Zionist Regime of Israel acknowledged the possession of nuclear weapons, but its representative has denied it. Now we have to request the Director General to send a team of inspectors to verify the nuclear activities, to clarify the said contradictions, and to report to the Board of Governors and other Member States accordingly.
Mr. Chairman,
Since there is no other Board meeting until March 2008, I feel obliged on behalf of my delegation to wish you, other Member States, Director General and his competent Staff, a very Mary Christmases and Happy New Year.
Thanks for your kind attention.
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