

**Working Paper
Submitted by
the Islamic Republic of Iran**

**To the First Session of the Preparatory Committee
For the 2010 NPT Review Conference**

On Nuclear Disarmament

1. In the course of the negotiations leading to the NPT, an integrated and a balanced package of rights and obligations was introduced according to which non-nuclear-weapon States undertake not to acquire nuclear weapons, and to place their facilities under the safeguard agreements. In return nuclear weapon States undertake not to transfer and develop nuclear weapons and commit themselves to practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. Moreover all States Parties to the Treaty undertake to cooperate and ensure the implementation of the inalienable rights of the States Parties for peaceful use of nuclear energy in a non-selective and non-discriminatory manner. In addition, universality of the Treaty has been assumed as a common international commitment of all member states.

2. Since 1978, when the final document of the SSODI confirmed nuclear disarmament as the highest priority on disarmament agenda, the international community had to wait for more than two decades to witness a comparable endorsement of its long sought goal in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The 2005 Review Conference was a sad setback in this direction. The 13 practical steps adopted by consensus in the 2000 NPT Review Conference is still making the hope for achieving the ultimate and urgent goal of international community of complete nuclear disarmament. We should not permit the hopes fade out again.

3. With the adoption of the 13 practical steps in the 2000 Review Conference, including the “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the Treaty”, hopes for the implementation of this fundamental part of the NPT was renewed. The 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT, was considered to be the most important achievement of the 2000 Review Conference in the field of nuclear disarmament. What non nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT now are expecting is considering the national reports by the nuclear weapon states with respect to their implementation of Article VI of the Treaty, including their measures adopted in implementation of the these 13 practical steps.

4. Since the 2000 NPT Conference, developments in the area of nuclear disarmament have not been promising. Despite the obligations under Article VI and undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States in 1995 and 2000, in particular the 13 practical steps, the continued development and deployment of thousands of nuclear warheads in the stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon States are still threatening international peace and security.

5. The non-entry into force of START II agreement, the reluctance to pursue the START III negotiations and abrogation of the ABM Treaty are among the serious set backs to the implementation of 13 practical steps. The international community has noted the signature of the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction in 2002. However, reductions as stipulated in this treaty are far below the international expectations for real steps towards total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moscow Treaty does not go beyond de-commissioning of nuclear weapons and Parties do not have any obligation to destroy their nuclear weapons. No verification mechanism is also envisaged. It, therefore, does not take into account the principles of “increased transparency”, “diminishing role for nuclear weapons” and “irreversibility” which were agreed by the nuclear-weapon States in the 2000 NPT Conference.

6. During the 2000 Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States committed themselves to “the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as integral part of the arms reduction and disarmament process”. In spite of that, no practical steps have been taken to reduce tactical nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States.

7. The adoption of the Nuclear Posture Review by the United States, and UK's Trident plan, provide for the development of new types of nuclear weapons, possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and targeting nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons States Parties to the Treaty, in contravention with the assurances given by the nuclear-weapon states at the time of the conclusion of the NPT and its indefinite extension.

8. Today in spite of allocation of hundreds of millions of dollars to projects aimed at developing mini-nuclear weapons or the so-called bunker busters, they are claimed to be simple research programs. The Preparatory Committee and the 2010 NPT Review Conference have an urgent task to address the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon states emanating from the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and alleviate these concerns by considering a decision on prohibition of development and production of any new nuclear weapons, particularly mini-nukes as well as a ban on construction of any new facility for the development, deployment and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in home and in foreign countries.

9. Moreover, real concerns of the international community over vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, transfer and deployment of nuclear weapons in territories of non-nuclear weapon states, lowering the threshold of resort to nuclear weapons and the danger

of using such inhumane weapons in conventional conflicts and against non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT, remains unabated. Ironically, some nuclear weapon states not only take no steps towards total elimination of their arsenals and giving no security assurances to non-nuclear states parties, but rather are threatening to be the first users.

10. In accordance with Article I of the NPT “Each nuclear-weapon state to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly”. Contrary to this obligation hundreds of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery have been and are still deployed in other countries and air forces of non-nuclear weapon states train delivery of these weapons under the cover of military alliances. In the same context, the nuclear sharing between nuclear weapon states and between nuclear weapon states and those states not parties to the Treaty is also a grave source of concern for NPT parties. The nuclear-weapon states should comply with their obligations under Article I by refraining from nuclear sharing, no matter what the pretext or under any kind of security arrangements or military alliance.

11. The NPT in its Article III.2 commits all States to refrain from the transfer of sensitive technology and materials to non-parties to the treaty, unless they are placed under the IAEA safeguards. Accordingly, the Prepcom sessions and the Review Conference should reaffirm the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to non-parties to the NPT, without exception and in particular to Israeli Regime , whose unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and its continued program for the development of nuclear weapons are a real threat to all countries in the Middle East and to the international peace and security. The United States is being a non compliant party in its undertakings under the provisions of the NPT by continuing nuclear sharing with Zionist Regime of Israel and strongly supporting of this regime by keeping silence on the recent acknowledgement of Israeli's Prime Minister of their nuclear arsenal. The inaction policy of the United States and some other nuclear weapon states in dealing with the real threats of nuclear arsenal of Zionist Regime to regional and international peace and security in the Security Council and other relevant forums constitutes act of horizontal proliferation, adding to their vertical one.

12. Although as a positive note nuclear testing moratorium has been maintained after the CTBT signature, some efforts are underway in United States to allocate millions of dollars to reduce the time necessary to resume a nuclear test up to 18 months that put into question their commitment on moratorium. The prospect for the CTBT entry into force has faced a serious set back by the rejection of the ratification process by the United States. Similarly at the time the prospect for commencing the negotiations of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was high, the unwarranted insistence from the same country for excluding the element of verification and past stockpiles from the negotiating mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee to be established at the CD has created an obstacle for the realization of this long standing commitment of the international community. It is time to seriously consider that by changing the negotiating mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee,

and make it reasonably balanced and concurrent with the mandates of the other Ad Hoc Committees, no basis is remained to allow for the commencement of the Cut-Off Treaty negotiations.

13. While the new issues such terrorism, non-proliferation threats and the role of non-states actors should be dealt with, it is very unfortunate that these issues are abused as pretexts to justify the pursuit of programs on new nuclear weapons system and the ignorance of nuclear disarmament obligations. Specific threats may not be resolved through resorting to more dangerous weapons with catastrophic consequences going well beyond any other threats in scope and effects.

14. The NPT Review Process should be able to reiterate once again its unconditional global call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and must assess the implementation of the 13 practical steps adopted by consensus in the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

15. Parties to the Treaty particularly the nuclear-weapon States should engage in good faith in substantive work of the Conference for the speedy and meaningful implementation of obligations under the Treaty including Article VI and the commitments made within 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences.

16. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time limit, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as the highest priority and as soon as possible of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament.

17. The question of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has been an important issue since the inception of the NPT.

18. The 2000 NPT Review Conference in paragraph 2 under “Article VII Chapter” of its Final Document reaffirmed the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to the non-nuclear-weapon States strengthen the nuclear proliferation regime and called upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2010 Review Conference. In view of this agreement, despite the inability of the Preparatory Committee, the NPT Review Conference has a clear mandate to make a decision on Negative Security Assurances.

19. We regret that the past review processes had been disabled from producing recommendations on the Security Assurances to the 2005 Review Conference. Therefore, we propose that the Conference would establish an AD-Hoc Committee to work on a draft legally binding instrument on providing security assurances by the five nuclear-

weapon states to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, and to submit the draft of the legal instrument to the Review Conference for its consideration and adoption.

20. As a first step to address the twin issues of illegality of use and NSA, we believe that as suggested by the NGO community this Conference should adopt a decision through which the Conference “decides that the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states shall be prohibited.”

21. In concluding let me express our disappointment and dismay that the delegation of the United States instead of opting to focus on the efforts that it has taken to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty, attempts, as cover-up, to forward accusations and passing arbitrary unjustified judgments against my country, through presenting completely distorted facts and conclusions which are in contradictions with the reports and decisions of the IAEA and its Board of Governors. Despite the futile tremendous efforts by the United States, no member state or IAEA document, inter alia has referred to the non-compliance of Iran with the NPT or diversion of its peaceful nuclear activities, although a very unhappy and frustrated case for the United States. The IAEA, on the contrary has concluded in one of its latest documents that following extensive inspections of all relevant facilities in Iran no trace has been found to show any diversion of the Iranian activities to other than peaceful purposes.

22. It is unfortunate, that a wrong legacy remains to be pursued and pronounced in the Review Conferences by stressing that the United States does not have particular obligations under Article IV of the Treaty and the US delegation should utilize every forum available to direct politically motivated accusations against Iran.

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