

## **MISSION REPORT**

### **VISIT TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 3-4 FEBRUARY 2007.**

The Troika Members of the Vienna Chapter of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) paid a visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran, from 3 to 4 February 2007.

Former and current Chairpersons of the Group of 77 and China, as well as the Representative of the League of Arab States, also took part in the visit, which responded to an invitation of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The complete list of members of the delegation is contained in Annex I.

H.E. Ambassador Ali Asgahr Soltanieh, Permanent Representative of Iran to the IAEA, accompanied the delegation throughout the visit.

The goals of the mission were the following:

1. To receive updated information from the authorities of Iran about the Iranian nuclear programme.
2. To visit some facilities of the Iranian nuclear programme.

The programme of the visit is contained in Annex 2.

#### **Visit to the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (UFC), 3 February 2007.**

The Uranium Conversion Facility (UFC) is located in the Nuclear Technology Centre of Isfahan, an important and historical city around 400 km away from Tehran. This facility is under IAEA safeguards in accordance with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement existing between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency.

The conversion of yellowcake into uranium oxide and then to uranium hexafluoride, are carried out in this plant. The uranium hexafluoride (UF<sub>6</sub>) is the gas used as initial material in the enrichment process.

The plant's managers presented the delegation with an overview of the past and current status of the facility, including its achievements.

Some of the aspects covered in the aforementioned overview are the following:

- The installation covers an area of 60 ha and the buildings occupy 200 000 m<sup>2</sup>.
- Initially, an agreement had been signed with a foreign country for the full supply of the plant. The foreign supplier gave the basic engineering

documents but then they decided not to continue with the project, which had to be assumed entirely by the Iranian experts. Most of the equipment in the facility was designed and manufactured in Iran.

- The plant has so far produced 250 T of UF<sub>6</sub> which are entirely under IAEA's safeguards.
- Approximately 1000 people work at this facility, including 200 professionals.

The delegation performed a guided tour of the facility. Among other things they could see the cameras placed by the IAEA inspectors to control the tanks where the final product (UF<sub>6</sub>) is stored.

The visit to the UFC was covered by national and international press. All journalists accompanied the delegation along the visit. At the end of the visit a meeting with the media was arranged. H.E. Ambassador Soltanieh explained the composition of the delegation and the goals of the visit and then answered the questions of the journalists.

As most of the journalist were interested in the NAM's position in relation to the Iranian nuclear issue, H:E Ambassador Goicochea read the text of the Declaration on this matter adopted during the 14th NAM Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Havana in September 2006.

### **Visit to the Tehran Research Reactor, 4 February 2007.**

The delegation visited the Research Reactor of the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), located at the University of Tehran and overseen by the AEOI.

During the visit to the installation it received the following information:

1. The reactor is a 5MWt pool-type, supplied by the United States in 1967.
2. The facility is under the IAEA full-scope safeguards since its start-up.
3. Initially the reactor used highly enriched uranium fuel. According to a contract signed before the Islamic Revolution between Iran and the USA, the latter had the obligation to deliver new fuel for the reactor and upgrade its power to 10 MW. However, the USA never supplied the fuel nor upgraded the reactor's power.
4. In 1987, the AEOI signed an agreement with the Argentinean firm INVAP for the conversion of the reactor from using 93 percent enriched uranium fuel to burning 20 percent enriched uranium fuel. The Argentinean Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEA) has subsequently supplied the reactor with IAEA safeguarded 20% enriched uranium.
5. The main purpose of the reactor is the production of radioisotopes for medicine and also for applications in agriculture, industry and others fields. Besides that, the reactor is equipped with facilities for Neutronography, Neutron Activation Analysis and Neutron Diffraction being used by different research groups in universities and others scientific institutions.

After the visit to the reactor itself, the delegation had the opportunity to see the adjacent facilities for handling the irradiated products (hot cells) and manipulators for preparing radiopharmaceuticals and diagnosis kits.

The experts of the TNRC explained the delegation that they supply their products to 120 hospitals, nuclear medicine centres and clinics, thus demonstrating the social and humanitarian impact of the work developed at this centre.

Among the most important products that the TNRC supplies to hospitals and clinics are the generators of Molybdenum-Techetium (Mo-Tc) which are essential for nuclear medicine applications, specially cancer diagnosis and treatment. The visitors were informed that, due to the low power of the reactor, they are unable to produce in it the Molybdenum needed for manufacturing the Mo-Tc generators, so they must import it from abroad. The experts explained that this is one of the main reasons for the construction of the 40MW research reactor in Arak to substitute the 35 years old Tehran research reactor

**Meeting with the Vice President and President of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran; 4 February 2007.**

After the visit to the research reactor and other facilities of the TNRC, a meeting was held with H.E. Mr. Aghazadeh, Vice President and President of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran where he officially welcomed the delegation to Iran.

Mr. Aghazadeh made an introductory explanation to the visitors, whose main elements were the following:

- For many years Iran tried to obtain the cooperation of the nuclear suppliers including western countries in order to develop its nuclear programme for peaceful uses. Nevertheless, this was not possible due to sanctions and political pressures. (He cited some examples. i.e., the USA did not supply the fuel for the 5MW reactor; Germany decided not to continue the construction of the Buser NPP, and France did not fulfilled their commitments with Iran as member ( 10% share holder ) of the consortium for Uranium enrichment EURODIF).
- Taking into account these facts and considering that the technology transfer in the nuclear field is highly politicized, Iran arrived to the conclusion that it should develop its nuclear programme by its own means. This included the decision on being self-sufficient in the nuclear fuel cycle. In this regard, he emphasized that it can be considered that a country masters the nuclear technology only in the case that it is capable to manufacture its own nuclear fuel.

- Iran has made a great effort to develop manpower. As a result, the country has thousands of highly qualified experts. Most of them are young scientists and engineers whose average age is 25-30 years.
- The nuclear programme has become a national pride and a model to others fields of science and technology in the country.
- Islamic Republic of Iran greatly appreciates NAM's support on this issue, which is very important for the other developing countries as well. In this context, he expressed the view that the failure of Iran in completing the nuclear fuel cycle will have a negative impact for the developing countries interested in achieving this goal.

In response, the Chairman of the Vienna Chapter of the Non-Aligned Movement thanked the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran for inviting the delegation to visit Iran, and reiterates the NAM positions on the Iran nuclear issue. She also expressed that such visits contribute to the process of confidence building.

Members of the delegation asked several questions to Mr. Aghazadeh. In answering them, he elaborated on the following points:

#### IRAN'S COOPERATION WITH THE IAEA:

He stressed the willingness of the Iranian authorities to fully cooperate with the Agency. He added that this cooperation however faces the following problems:

1. At present the IAEA's approach to the Iranian nuclear issue is more political than technical, and this fact obstructs the solution of the few pending issues. He said they are convinced that the Iranian dossier will remain open while the political issues continue without solution. In this context, he stated that the DG has reported the pending issues belonging to the past and that Dr. Larijani, Head of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, has proposed the Agency to elaborate a plan of action within a time framework to address such issues.
2. Several IAEA inspectors, especially those from Western countries do not observe the confidentiality of the information. Many detailed confidential information have been leaked out to the media creating problems.
3. The inspections address issues and give requests that go beyond legal obligations of the country. He expressed that the demands of the Agency have no limits and that such behaviour is unacceptable for Iran.

### ELBARADEI's PROPOSAL (TIME-OUT).

Mr. Aghazadeh recalled that Iran already voluntarily suspended for almost 3 years its activities in the nuclear fuel cycle , particularly in enrichment ,during the negotiations with the 3 EU countries which did not lead to any concrete results. He said that such situation was frustrating and added that now the western countries are using the same tactics.

Mr. Aghazadeh explained that Iran had proposed to start negotiations without any precondition. In its framework the issue of suspension could have been discussed. EU3 ignored the offer.

Mr. Aghazadeh reiterated the decision of the Government and the people of Iran to continue with their nuclear programme.

He criticized the double standards of the western countries on these issues and added that the silence of these countries about the declaration by Israel on possession of nuclear weapons is a clear evidence of such double standards.

### NATANZ.

In relation to this issue Mr. Aghazadeh informed that:

- Almost 1000 people work and are making important progresses in this facility.
- The installation of the electrical and other technical networks has been already finished. This was a very complex work taking into account that the facility is located 25m underground and have an area of thousands square meters.
- They have started the installation of the 3000 centrifuges. He hope the goal of installation of one cascade (164 centrifuges) per week could be realized.
- The IAEA inspectors visited Natanz a few days ago. They installed the cameras for 24 hours surveillance in order to control the nuclear material feeding.
- The inspectors have been taking pictures of the different stages of the installation process.
- Iran is providing the inspectors all the information about the plant with full transparency. He mentioned that, this is not a common approach in the

world and highlighted specific cases of countries that having similar facilities, have imposed strict limitations to the inspector's access.

- They are planning to invite the ambassadors accredited in Tehran, even those outside the NAM, as well as the media for visiting Natanz. He regretted that due to time constraints the delegation was unable to visit Arak and Natanz nuclear facilities. He expressed that transparency is very important in order to fight the disinformation campaigns against the Iranian nuclear programme.

#### OTHER ISSUES.

- Regarding the safety of the Buzher NPP, Mr. Aghazadeh indicated that its construction is in conformity with the international nuclear safety standards. He informed that the IAEA experts had visited the plant in several occasions and that Iran has invited the neighbour countries to send their safety experts to the plant in order to remove ambiguities on safety if any.
- About the cooperation in the nuclear field with other developing countries, Mr. Aghazadeh stressed the readiness and interest of Iran in taking steps in that direction and realizing this kind of cooperation.

**Annex 1.****List of participants in the visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
3-4 February 2007.**

1. Ambassador H.E. **Ms. Norma GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ**, Resident Representative of Cuba to IAEA, Chairperson of the NAM Vienna Chapter.
2. Ambassador H.E. **Mr. Mohd.Arshad bin MANZOOR HUSSAIN** ,Resident Representative of Malaysia to IAEA, Member of the NAM Troika
3. Ambassador H.E. **Mr. Ramzy Ezzeldin RAMZY**, Resident Representative of Egypt to IAEA, Member of the NAM Troika.
4. Ambassador H.E. **Mr. Sayed Galal ELDIN ELAMIN**, Resident Representative of Sudan to IAEA, Chairman of the Vienna Chapter of G-77.
5. Ambassador H.E. **Ms. Taous FEROUKHI** , Resident Representative of Algeria to IAEA, former Chairperson of the Vienna Chapter of G-77
6. Ambassador H.E. **Mr. Mikhael WEHBE** , Resident Representative of League of Arab States.
7. **Mr. Daniel CODORNIU PUJALS**, Alternate Resident Representative of Cuba to IAEA, Coordinator of the NAM Open-ended Working Group on IAEA matters.

Annex 2.**PROGRAMME**

<i>Date/ Activity</i>	<i>Time</i>
<b><i>Friday, 2 February 2007</i></b>	
Departure for Teheran (OS 871)	<i>2010 hrs</i>
<b><i>Saturday,3 February 2007</i></b>	
Arrival at Teheran	<i>0305 hrs</i>
Departure for Isfahan	<i>1400 hrs</i>
Visit to Isfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre	<i>1530hrs</i>
Departure for Teheran	<i>2240 hrs</i>
<b><i>Sunday, 4 February 2007</i></b>	
Visit to Tehran Research Reactor	<i>1000 hrs</i>
Meeting with H.E. Mr. Aghazadeh, Iran's Vice-President and President of AEOI	<i>1100 hrs</i>
<b><i>Monday, 5 February 2004</i></b>	
Departure from the hotel	<i>0230 hrs</i>
Departure for Vienna (OS 872)	<i>0400 hrs</i>
Arrival at Vienna	<i>0630 hrs</i>