Statement
By
H.E. Ambassador Soltanieh
Permanent Representative to the United Nations and
Other International Organizations
Before
The Board of Governors of the IAEA
9 March 2011
In the Name of God the Most Gracious and the Most Merciful
Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished Delegates,
At the outset I would like to express my sincere condolences for the loss of H.
E. Ambassador Fuad Ismayilov, Permanent Representative of brotherly and
neighboring country
Mr. Chairman,
I am obliged to express sincere appreciation for the indispensible support of
family members of the Non-Aligned Movement for the peaceful nuclear activities
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, echoed in the statement delivered by the
distinguished Ambassador of Egypt.
Mr. Chairman,
Permit me to shortly review the report of Director General on the implementation
of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2011/7). A thorough review is
going to be distributed in an explanatory note for the consideration of all
General Remarks
The main mandate of the Agency in the course of inspections is to verify
non-diversion of declared nuclear material. The Agency should restrictedly
reflect in its reports to the Board of Governors the results of its verification
work. It has to report simply whether the inspectors have been able to conduct
verification or not. If so, whether their findings are consistent with the
declarations.
According to paragraph 27 of the Resolution on the Safeguards adopted by the
General Conference (GC(53)/RES/14), the Agency should provide objective,
technically and factually based reports with appropriate reference to relevant
provisions of Safeguards Agreement.
According to resolution GC(54)/RES/11 of the 54th General Conference,
the Agency should protect the commercial proprietary and confidential
information during verification in
Provision of detailed technical information in the report, coming to the
inspectors’ knowledge through carrying out the verification work, not only does
not have any utility for the readers consisting range of various group of people
from diplomats to public in the
street, but it creates confusion paving the way for misuse and thus political
tensions. In addition such detailed technical information is in contravention
with the principle of protection of confidential information.
The Secretariat has to merely verify the declaration of Member States based on
Safeguards Agreements with the Agency. It does not have the mandate to complain
why the Member States are not fulfilling their obligations. It has also no
mandate to urge Member States adhere to a treaty or accept additional legal and
financial obligations and to judge what will be the consequences. The Agency has
to simply report the technical findings during verification process.
The fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of States in
accordance with their respective Safeguards Agreements and those of confidence
building measures undertaken voluntarily has to be clearly reflected in two
distinct parts in the report.
Specific Remarks
1)
The Director General
has made distinction in his report, to some extent, between the measure related
to the obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the other
requests falling outside such as those by the United Nations Security Council
and the Additional Protocol. This is a step in right direction.
Director
General has attached list of activities and nuclear facilities to the report
which contains:
a)
Those under the
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
b)
Those which are
requested by the United Nations Security Council to be suspended.
The thorough
detailed report on the first category related to
2)
The second category of
long list proves our long assertion that the real intention of the proponents of
the illegal UNSC resolutions is not temporary suspension of merely enrichment
activities but suspension of all nuclear fuel cycle, paving the way for their
ultimate cessation of all nuclear activities in
3)
The paragraph 47 of
the summary reads: “While the Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of
the declared nuclear materials at the nuclear facilities and the LOFs declared
by Iran under Safeguards Agreement, Iran is not providing necessary cooperation
to enable the Agency to provide credible assurance about the absence of
undeclared material and activities in Iran, therefore to conclude that all
nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities”.
I recall the
Annual Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR), document GOV/2010/25 reads: “Safeguards
activities were implemented for 73 States with comprehensive safeguards
agreements in force, but without additional protocols in force. For these
States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear
material from peaceful nuclear activities. On this basis, the Secretariat
concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful
activities”.
The key
conclusion is that: After the most robust inspection during last 8 years, being
unprecedented in the history of the Agency, no evidence of diversion of nuclear
material to prohibited purposes is found and all declared nuclear materials
remain in peaceful activities. This important message to the whole world is
overshadowed and undermined in this report.
4)
In several occasions
specifically in the course of last session of the Board of Governors in December
2010, I thoroughly elaborated the reasons, four main legal reasons, based on the
Agency Statute and the NPT, why the resolutions of the UNSC do not have any
legal basis thus could not be implemented. The maximum it could do is to conduct
verification and give a factual report without any judgment or any
recommendation. Therefore the content of paragraphs 2 and 3 which was reflected
for the first time is out of context and beyond the mandate of the Secretariat.
The Secretariat has no mandate to inter into debate among the Member States as
regard to legality of demands such as the ones by the UNSC. Such conducts put
the impartiality of the Secretariat in jeopardy and politicizes the technical
and professional nature of its statutory functions.
5)
In fulfilling the
expectation the Secretariat has only one function vis-à-vis the UNSC to verify
whether Iran has suspended enrichment and reprocessing related activities or
not. I have, on behalf of my Government, in several occasions declared that we
have done so once for 2.5 years voluntarily since 2003, but pursuant to
confrontational acts including non-compliance to their commitments agreed upon
with Iran and illegally conveying the issue to the UNSC by EU3 and US, our
parliament had no choice but to mandate the Government to stop voluntary
measures including suspension and the implementation of the Additional Protocol.
We stopped the suspension which did not have any technical and legal
justification. Therefore the answer is very straight forward:
Having said so,
I do not find any logic for the Agency to spend a lot of money of tax payers in
all countries and waste the valuable time and efforts of the inspectors to
verify whether
6)
Regarding the content
of paragraph 46, where it reads: “
a)
The Additional
Protocol is not a legally binding instrument, as confirmed in the 2010 Review
Conference of the NPT by consensus.
b)
The modified Code 3.1
of the Subsidiary Arrangements is a recommendation of the Board of Governments
and is not an integral part of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
(INFCIRC/153), thus is not a legally binding instrument.
c)
The Islamic Republic
of Iran was voluntarily implementing the Additional Protocol and the modified
Code 3.1 for 2.5 years since 2003 but it was forced to stop after the EU3 and
Therefore the
content of the paragraph 46 in the summary of the report is inconsistence with
legal criteria and the reality on the ground.
7)
With respect to the
issue of alleged studies and allegation of possible military dimensions I have
to refer you all to my previous explanations. However it suffices to highlight
the fact that all past such allegations, specifically by
8)
The report is expected
to reflect the results of the Agency’s verification for the period of December
to March 2011. The report consists of unnecessarily extensive details on the
ongoing ordinary technical activities of the peaceful nuclear activities in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, which contravenes the protection of the sensitive
proprietary information of the Member States.
Mr. Chairman,
As you are
aware my Government has invited the Ambassadors of the Troika of the Non-Aligned
Movement, Chairman of G-77 and the Permanent representative of the League of
Arabs to pay a visit to our nuclear facilities in 2004 and 2007. Once again with
the purpose of maximum transparency and enhancement of cooperative environment
among all Member States, my Government decided to expand the invitees to
representatives of other geographical groups. Some, however, rather than
welcoming such a historical unique offer of a visit to the most sensitive
nuclear activities refrained from participation, raising different reasons. I am
pleased to report that the visit was made on 15-16 January 2011 in an effective
manner to both Natanz Enrichment Plant including the cascade hall for up to 20%
enrichment and the Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor and Heavy water Production
Plant. During the visit the representatives to the IAEA had opportunity to
observe the activities of the Agency safeguards, including 24 hours surveillance
equipments, seals, and inspectors conducting their job. In addition, the team of
Ambassadors from
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, distinguished colleagues,
Permit me to conclude my statement by reiterating the position of my country
vis-à-vis application of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, by recalling the
historical message of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
International Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation held in
“Atomic and nuclear science are among the greatest achievement of the humankind
and must be at the service of welfare and advancement of all human societies.
The application fields of nuclear science cover a wide spectrum of medical,
energy and industrial uses, each being of essential importance….The nations in
the
Mr. Chairman,
I feel obliged to once again call upon all to spare no effort to put an end to
the politically motivated boring debates in the Board of Governors and let’s
open a new chapter of mutual trust and collective cooperation to implement the
statutory objectives for the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy
contributing to the peace and prosperity in the world.
Having just heard the statement by the group 5+1, I have to declare the
followings:
As agreed in
Geneva3 talks, the Islamic Republic of Iran is fully prepared to continue
negotiation for cooperation on common elements with 5+1, as it was clearly
articulated by H.E. Dr. Jalili the Secretary of National Supreme Council in the
course of negotiation in Istanbul.
As a matter of
principle recognition of the inalienable right of nations and refrain from
confrontation with such right are basic requirements for any successful
negotiation. As you are all aware such principle is foundation for civilized
talks and is not considered as pre-condition. Based on this principle the
Islamic Republic of Iran is ready to start negotiation as soon as the group 5+1
is ready. I advise the group 5+1 to seize this unique opportunity, to change the
gear from confrontation to cooperation, to come to negotiation table without
further delay.
Remark on some statements
The comment by
Zionist regime of
As regards to the statement of distinguished
ambassador of Japan, I have to recall my previous statement where I pose the
question of the justification of huge enrichment and plutonium production, in
the scale of tons, where it could obtain easily from market. I would like to
inform you that recently the Governor of TOKYO in his interview with British
News Paper INDEPENDENT has said that
I request Director General to investigate and report
to the Member States.
Thank you for your kind attention.
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