Mr. Chairman,

At the outset I fell obliged to express my deepest condolence and solidarity to the people of Japan. Japanese people deserve special sympathy since they remembered the horrible memories of military attack against Hiroshima and Nagasaki by United States using atomic bomb turning thousands of innocent civilian into ashes and leaving radiological long term consequences.

Mr. Chairman,

Associating myself with the Statement of the Group 77 and China I would like to share the following views concerning the Fukushima Nuclear accident:

1-Nuclear power is and will be a viable source of energy considering that nuclear power plant do not have negative impacts on global warming and greenhouse effect where other types of power plants particular those consuming coal have serious hazardous environmental consequences.

2-  Over 64,600 billion KW electricity have been produced by nuclear power plants during last half a century. Over 440 nuclear power plants are producing about 16% electricity in over 30 countries.

3- There main accidents have occurred since 50 years ago: The TMI in the United States in 1978, Chernobyl of the Soviet Union in 1986, and the Fukushima of Japan.

4-Application of nuclear safety standards is essential in safe operation of nuclear power plants. Learning lessons from accidents is instrumental in enhancement of nuclear safety.

5-According to two conventions, Early Notification and Emergency Assistance, both Japan and the IAEA had clear obligation keeping Member States continuously informed about the development including the dimensions of accident release of radioactive material.

6-The weak and slow-motion reaction of the Secretariat specifically DG to the Fukushima accident was very disappointing. DG was expected to promptly get reliable information from Japan, validate them and transmit to Member States. Not only this simple legitimate expectation of transfer of information was not fulfilled but the technical staffs of the Safety Department were not in position or presumably not permitted to explain and answer technical questions during technical briefings. During first week of technical briefing in some cases DG himself decided to answer the technical questions where his scientific staff were keeping silent or merely give information based on information from data. We all had no more than what we had received from news media. It is a matter of serious concern and should not be repeated in the future.

It is well understood that the Japanese operators being unable to manage the accident possibly due to the panic highly expected and were in urgent need of receiving immediate technical advice from outside, the IAEA, since they were in the scene of accident. But DG did neither establish promptly a team of eminent experts from the Agency or from the world nor did he send timely a team to help them how to prevent escalation. Therefore we are witness of the release of radioactivity to whole world.

7- I recall that DG did not even ask for information from CTBTO on the radioactive release from its stations until representatives of some Member States including neighbors of Japan, worrying about contamination of their country, and myself urged DG and insisted during briefing to take serious practical steps including getting data from the CTBTO.  World specifically the neighboring countries had the right to get prompt reliable information of contamination which has health hazards to their people. I am of the belief that neither the Agency nor Japan have fully complied with obligation under both post Chernobyl conventions that is Early notification and emergency assistance in case of nuclear accidents.  

8-Most of the information provided by the Secretariat in most of technical briefing meeting were not coherent and well assessed after validation.

9-The Fact Finding Mission was also realized with delay thus its report has not been ready for timely utilization by Member States.

10-The question remains whether if a nuclear accident had happened in other Member States, the conduct of the Secretariat would have been the same.

11- The last but not the least is the unreasonable approach in dealing with the accident and the future measures. Undoubtedly after an accident a scientific and technical meeting with participants from the country concern, Japan, and top experts from all over the world to assess the accident lessons to be learned then to convene a political high level conference to adopt a long term strategy based on technical finding. Unfortunately we were taken by surprise by the decision by DG without any consultation with the Member States sending invitations to foreign ministers for a Ministerial Conference before a technical meeting be held. I recall that in case of Chernobyl Accident Agency followed logical approach, having technical meeting with eminent experts then conducted the Special General Conference to adopt the road map for the future. The Secretariat has to be reminded that they perform under the mandate of Member States.   

Mr. Chairman,

In this context I would like to put on record that the DG and his DDG on safety have not taken the issue of universal approach and collective endeavors on nuclear safety which is global concern into serious consideration. In several occasions the expert from Iran have been deprived from participating at the Agency’s seminars or workshops on nuclear safety, including the International Conference in Japan held before Fukushima Accident and the one called : IAEA Technical Meeting on Newly Arising Threats in Cyber security of Nuclear Facilities held 16 to 20 May 2011. In response to our inquiry the Secretariat claimed that the resolutions of the UN Security Council are the reasons for depriving Iranian experts to participate at these meetings on nuclear safety. I reminded DDG for safety that even the UNSC resolution which I believe they lack legal basis have exempted nuclear safety.

I do hope that after terrible unprecedented nuclear accident of Fukushima and the radiological impact Mr. Amano and his staff in nuclear Safety Department have noticed that nuclear accident and trans-boundary release of radioactive material do not recognize international border. This is a matter of concern of all Member States thus it requires collective measure in a cooperative approach without discrimination and apart from any political intentions or politically motivated measures. Based on the above concerns and the learning lessons from Fukushima accident I am sure that Member States would hold Secretariat accountable for any negligence and carelessness in incorporating the technical needs of Member States specifically developing countries related to nuclear safety.

I invite all for closer collaboration among Member States for enhancement of nuclear safety facilitating enhancement of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In conclusion I would like to express appreciation for sincere professional attempts by H.E. Ambassador Antonio Guerreiro of Brazil for consultation and preparation of the Ministerial Conference.

I thank you Mr. Chairman

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